US Tightens AI Chip Rules to Close China’s Remote-Access Loophole

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On November 16, 2026, the Trump administration closed a major gap: remote access to American AI chips housed in overseas data centers, a channel Chinese companies had been using. The interim final rule from the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) at the Commerce Department extends controls to five countries across Asia and Latin America.

๐Ÿ”‘ Key takeaways

  • A US license will be required to ship, reexport or transfer advanced AI chips to Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Brazil.
  • The rule targets remote access to computing power, which had largely fallen outside controls on physical exports.
  • The probe into Megaspeed, suspected of helping Chinese firms circumvent export rules, provides the immediate backdrop.
  • Sources disagree on the effective date, and Beijing calls the measure “economic coercion”.
  • The CSIS argues that export controls alone cannot guarantee American leadership in chips.

A closed loophole: controlling remote access

Until now, US restrictions mainly targeted physical exports of advanced chips. Yet Chinese companies could rent computing power hosted in foreign data centers filled with Nvidia GPUs, without those chips ever crossing a Chinese border. The new rule addresses that gap: operators of data centers serving customers in China, Russia, Iran, Cuba or other countries will now have to identify their end users.

A license will be required to ship, reexport or transfer advanced AI chips to five countries that BIS classifies as presenting an above-normal diversion risk. According to Bloomberg, data center operators must obtain US authorization before exporting Nvidia and other American chipmakers’ products to these destinations. A carve-out for chips destined for US-headquartered firms is, however, conditioned on reporting duties, including a monthly report identifying the transaction parties and the nature of the chips.

“The rule is designed to ensure that existing restrictions on access to sensitive American technology cannot be circumvented by remote computing arrangements involving data centers in third countries.”

Bureau of Industry and Security, Commerce Department, interim final rule

The move responds to criticism that controls on physical exports left a door open. Republican Representative Michael Lawler of New York introduced a bill in 2025 to extend controls to remote access, and the House has since passed it.

Before Congress, he argued that existing restrictions allowed China to access American technology through the cloud, which he described as a real way of getting around US limits.

Megaspeed, the case that accelerated the decision

The immediate backdrop is the investigation into Megaspeed International, a Singapore-based company that supplies computing power to Chinese firms using chips installed in data centers across Southeast Asia, notably in Malaysia. The New York Times reported in 2025 that US authorities suspected Megaspeed of helping Chinese companies obtain Nvidia chips and get around export rules.

A timeline in several stages

  1. 2024: the Commerce Department opens an investigation into Megaspeed for suspected export control violations.
  2. May 2025: document requests are sent to Nvidia about its sales to Megaspeed.
  3. June 2025: Nvidia places Megaspeed on its “no sell” list.
  4. From February 2025: Singapore investigates possible false statements about server purchases and their routing to Malaysia.
  5. Afterwards: Commerce agents, alongside Singaporean police, inspect Megaspeed’s premises and question Alice Huang, who led the company until 2025. The Justice Department takes over the criminal investigation.

Tensions inside the administration have also surfaced. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent reproached Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick for being slow to put Megaspeed under restrictions. On Monday, Donald Trump acknowledged the divisions and suggested Lutnick may have delayed action to avoid an “explosion” in the US-China relationship.

“We have very good relations with China right now, and I understand both sides of the situation.”

Donald Trump, President of the United States

Past workarounds and regional responses

Controls in place since 2022 have not stopped every workaround. The table below lists the documented cases.

CaseAlleged methodStatus
HuaweiShell companies ordered two million chiplets from TSMC for Ascend 910 processors, two of which would be combined into a future Ascend 910CTSMC halted orders after discovering the fraud
Luxuriate Your LifePurchase of servers containing banned Nvidia GPUs for $390 million from Dell and Supermicro, then shipped to MalaysiaThree individuals prosecuted by Singaporean authorities
Shenzhen marketVendors offering hundreds or thousands of restricted chipsReported by the New York Times in 2024

Singapore says it is negotiating with Washington to preserve “trusted access” for its companies while “carefully studying the details of this new measure”. The ministries of Digital Development and Information, and of Energy, Trade and Industry, plan to contact affected firms. The city-state says it takes its international reputation “seriously” and will not let companies exploit its image to bypass other countries’ laws.

“Malaysia welcomes investment in data centers and technology, but will not allow itself to be used to circumvent export controls.”

Government of Malaysia, official statement

Beijing responded through foreign ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun, who accused Washington of arbitrarily interfering with China’s trade and technology exchanges. He called the measure a “typical example of economic coercion and long-arm jurisdiction” that runs counter to the shared understanding between the two sides. Analysts have also warned that the restrictions could reduce Chinese demand for computing power hosted in Southeast Asia and put billions of dollars of data center investment at risk.

A control policy built over time

The November 2026 rule follows a series of earlier measures. The 2022 limits covered logic chips at 16 or 14 nanometers or below, DRAM memory with a half-pitch of 18 nanometers or below, and NAND memory with 128 layers or more. Facilities owned by Chinese entities were subject to a “presumption of denial”.

DateMeasureScope
October 7, 2022Controls on advanced computing chips, manufacturing equipment and licenses for fabs in ChinaChina
October 2023 and December 2024Tightened rules, followed by similar measures adopted by alliesChina and allies
March 2025Dozens of Chinese entities added to restriction listsChinese entities
November 16, 2026Interim rule on remote access and export licensesFive countries and data centers

According to the CSIS, the first measures pushed up the prices of some components and led to job cuts in China. They also cost US and allied manufacturers significant revenue, reduced their visibility into the Chinese industry and weakened their capacity to fund research. Above all, they spurred China’s drive for self-sufficiency. Jordan Schneider, senior analyst at the Rhodium Group, estimated that an independent supply chain would require:

“Hundreds of billions of dollars and an incredible amount of talent and engineering energy.”

Jordan Schneider, Senior Analyst, Rhodium Group

Documented Chinese progress

  • SMIC reportedly produces Huawei’s Kirin 9000C chip; the Pura 70 reportedly contains 33 Chinese components and only five foreign ones.
  • Alibaba unveiled the C930 processor, based on the RISC-V architecture, in February 2025.
  • DeepSeek released its open model R1 in January 2025, with performance roughly comparable to models from Google, OpenAI, Meta and Anthropic.
  • According to Georgetown’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology, cited by the CSIS, China publishes twice as many scientific papers as the United States on semiconductor design and manufacturing.
  • In March 2025, researchers at Peking University announced a two-dimensional transistor running 40% faster than TSMC’s 3-nanometer devices, using 10% less energy.

The CSIS concludes that Chinese companies can keep advancing through alternatives that are “almost as good”, even if they are less efficient or less profitable than Western technologies.


Outlook: three scenarios to watch

The enforcement timeline remains unclear: ABC News, citing the BIS, reports immediate effect, while the SCMP says Washington did not specify an effective date. Three scenarios look plausible over the medium term.

  • Strict enforcement: reporting and end-user identification duties weigh on data center operators in Southeast Asia, with a risk of slower announced investment.
  • Diplomatic compromise: the fragile trade truce with Beijing leads Washington to calibrate licenses, particularly for regional allies.
  • Legislative toughening: in the Senate, several proposals would require congressional review of AI chip licenses for China and align the Netherlands and Japan with US rules.

In every case, the stakes extend beyond chips themselves: they concern China’s ability to train frontier models and Washington’s ability to enforce controls that no longer stop at physical borders.

Sources

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