Chainflip’s FLIP sinks 34% after $4.86M vault drain and key breach

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An attacker emptied the liquid balance of Chainflip’s Ethereum vault, roughly $4.86 million, in under ten minutes. Decurity says the exploit does not appear to stem from a smart contract bug but from access to the validators’ aggregate signing key. FLIP fell about 34% in the wake of the attack, which Chainflip has not yet explained.

๐Ÿ”‘ Key takeaways

  • Roughly $4.86M lost on November 21, 2026 at about 2:10 a.m. ET (520.2 ETH, $3.25M in USDC and 758,000 USDT).
  • Leading hypothesis: compromise of the aggregate signing key shared by 150 validators, not confirmed by Chainflip.
  • Almost all funds sent to Tornado Cash through a newly created wallet.
  • FLIP down about 34%, market cap falling from $41.6M to $27.1M.
  • Protocol placed in “full safe mode”; no reimbursement plan announced yet.

A $4.86 million drain in under ten minutes

On November 21, 2026, around 2:10 a.m. ET, an attacker drained the liquid balance of Chainflip’s Ethereum vault. The haul, valued at the time of the attack, included 520.2 ETH, $3.25 million in USDC and 758,000 USDT, for a total of about $4.86 million. The entire operation lasted less than ten minutes.

Security firm Decurity was the first to flag the incident on X through its Defimon Alerts bot. Its alert said the Ethereum vault had been emptied of “its entire liquid balance”. AMLBot then relayed the alert and reported that the attacker had moved nearly all of the stolen funds to the Tornado Cash mixer using a new wallet.

A compromised signing key rather than a contract bug?

According to Decurity, the attack does not appear to involve a flaw in a smart contract. Instead, the attacker reportedly gained access to the aggregate signing key of Chainflip’s validator network, the secret data that authorizes transfers. An aggregate key is reconstructed from fragments held by several participants. The classification remains a hypothesis: Chainflip acknowledged a “potential exploit” but has not confirmed the cause.

The design is meant to withstand the compromise of a single party. The key is jointly controlled by 150 validators. No validator holds the full key; each holds a share, and normally 100 of the 150 validators must sign a transaction. The key is rotated every three days. According to The Block, the last rotation took place on November 18 at 4:53 p.m. ET, roughly two and a half days before the attack. Chainflip has not explained how the attacker obtained the key.

ParameterValueNote
Validators150Key split into shares
Signing threshold100 of 150Signatures required per transaction
Key rotationEvery 3 daysLast rotation: November 18, 4:53 p.m. ET
Delay after the theftAbout 1h45Key change observed by Bitquery

“The laundering was executed with high-speed automation.”

AMLBot, blockchain analytics firm

An abnormal nonce points to a signature issued outside the system

Bitquery flagged an anomaly in the nonce tied to the attacker’s withdrawal. This number is meant to be used only once and normally increments by one to prevent replay of old transactions. It hovered around 315,000 during the attack, whereas the nonce used by the attacker contained 39 digits.

Bitquery argues this suggests the authorization did not come through Chainflip’s normal process, which would have assigned the next nonce, but that the attacker produced a valid signature outside that system. The firm notes this is the only case among 299,677 signatures observed since 2023 to break the sequence. It also found the key changed about one hour and 45 minutes after the theft. That timing may reflect a rotation meant to prevent further withdrawals, but Bitquery stresses that no conclusion can be drawn from timing alone.

“We’re aware of a potential exploit affecting Chainflip vaults.”

Chainflip, statement on X

Fast laundering and funds beyond reach

AMLBot argues the stablecoins moved too quickly for Circle, issuer of USDC, and Tether, issuer of USDT, to freeze them. Almost all of the funds were sent to Tornado Cash through the new wallet.

Chainflip’s vaults on other networks, notably Bitcoin and Solana, appeared unaffected. However, a Bitcoin transaction moved nearly 10.5 BTC from an old vault address to a brand-new address, about two hours after the protocol was paused. According to The Block, this could be a safeguard move for the remaining funds, but its purpose has not been confirmed and security firms had not flagged it at the time.

FLIP slides 34% as market cap shrinks

The market reacted immediately. The FLIP token dropped roughly 34% after the exploit. According to The Block’s price data, its market capitalization fell from about $41.6 million to $27.1 million at the time of publication.

IndicatorValueSource
FLIP price declineAbout 34%The Block
Market cap before the exploit$41.6MThe Block
Market cap at publication$27.1MThe Block
Total haul$4.86MValue at the time of the attack

Chainflip put the protocol into “full safe mode”. Its precautionary message on X summarized the scope:

“As a precaution, the protocol is being put into full safe mode. Deposits, withdrawals, swaps and quoting are disabled.”

Chainflip, statement on X

Deposits, withdrawals, swaps and quoting were therefore disabled. At publication, Chainflip had not said whether it planned to compensate victims, and the protocol had not responded to The Block’s request for comment. The investigation into the key compromise and the path taken by the funds was still ongoing.

A September precedent: the Tron memo flaw

Chainflip had already suffered a separate incident on September 12, publicly disclosed on September 13. An attacker drained 736,442.17 USDT from the vault linked to the Tron integration through six unauthorized payments out of eight attempts made over about 90 minutes. The attacker began with small amounts to confirm the method, then roughly doubled the size of each following attempt.

The flaw lay in how Tron transaction memos were processed. Chainflip read swap instructions from these memos, whereas most supported chains rely on dedicated contract functions. The attacker managed to attach its own memo to a transaction already signed by validators. The system read this memo as a separate swap, treated it as a failed swap and triggered a refund, so the same deposit was paid out twice.

The method only affected USDT transactions on Tron. Six of the eight attempts succeeded. Chainflip detected the problem after subsequent USDT payouts began failing. A user swap of 115,654.41 USDT could not be paid, but those funds stayed in the vault. According to Chainflip, the other funds were not affected. The protocol had suspended operations until at least Monday, September 14, the earliest date considered for a restart, and promised a full report once the restart was secured.

Validators then voted to reimburse affected liquidity providers using the protocol’s “surplus funds”. Chainflip describes these excess funds as a mix of gas-fee-related balances, assets sent in error and other surpluses, some still unexplained, that accumulated since launch.

“It is both excess funds held by the protocol through gas fee interactions, assets sent to Chainflip in error that the protocol could not automatically return, and other sometimes so far unexplained surpluses that have built up in the vaults since launch.”

Chainflip, statement on surplus funds

Chainflip also said that the rise of sophisticated AI models is reshaping security, and that it intends to expand internal use of these tools to detect problems before attackers do. MOCA suspended all operations routed through Chainflip, stating that its own users’ funds were not affected. Its representatives said Chainflip had isolated the problem to a single swap direction and expressed support for the protocol.


Outlook and scenarios

The exact cause remains unconfirmed. If the key compromise is validated, the central question shifts from smart contract code to key governance and rotation mechanisms. Three scenarios stand out: a rapid restart backed by compensation from surplus funds, which would ease pressure on FLIP; a restart conditioned on an independent audit and a full technical report, which could take several weeks; or a lasting loss of liquidity confidence that weighs on the token’s value and on protocol usage.

Observers should watch three items: Chainflip’s final report, the fate of the 10.5 BTC that moved and of the funds sent to Tornado Cash, and any decision to compensate victims.

Sources

This article is published for informational and educational purposes only. It does not constitute investment advice in any way. Do your own research (DYOR) before making any decision.

Disclaimer: this content is for information purposes only and is not financial advice. Cryptocurrencies are highly volatile: you may lose all of your capital. Always do your own research. Legal notice
Telemac
Telemachttp://cryptoinfo.ch
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