According to the article, Nvidia’s strong results show that the company does not need Jensen Huang to return, while interim CEO Colette Kress raised its outlook with authority. The author argues that the real failure involved the CEO’s judgment, the board’s culture, and weak oversight, rather than checklist procedures or the company’s capital structure. He criticizes separation of the chair and CEO roles, additional independent directors, and automatic condemnation of dual-class shares as irrelevant solutions, noting that Nvidia already had numerous formal governance safeguards. The author links this reliance on indicators to Goodhart’s Law, warning that a measure can eventually capture something other than the underlying objective, and urges boards to exercise independent judgment and diligence. Major failures such as Enron, Silicon Valley Bank, and Lehman Brothers likewise occurred at companies whose boards appeared compliant with formal standards without providing effective oversight.
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